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Abstract
We study the model of interacting agents proposed by Chatterjee (2003) that al-
lows agents to both save and exchange wealth. Closed equations for the wealth
distribution are developed using a mean field approximation.
We show that when all agents have the same fixed savings propensity, subject to
certain well defined approximations defined in the text, these equations yield the
conjecture proposed by Chatterjee (2003) for the form of the stationary agent wealth
distribution.
If the savings propensity for the equations is chosen according to some random
distribution we show further that the wealth distribution for large values of wealth
displays a Pareto like power law tail, ie P (w) ∼ w1+a. However the value of a for
the model is exactly 1. Exact numerical simulations for the model illustrate how, as
the savings distribution function narrows to zero, the wealth distribution changes
from a Pareto form to to an exponential function. Intermediate regions of wealth
may be approximately described by a power law with a > 1. However the value
never reaches values of ∼ 1.6 − 1.7 that characterise empirical wealth data. This
conclusion is not changed if three body agent exchange processes are allowed. We
conclude that other mechanisms are required if the model is to agree with empirical
wealth data.
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1 Introduction
The distribution of wealth or income in society has been of great interest
for many years. Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto (1897) was the first to sug-
gest it followed a “natural law” where the higher end of the wealth distribu-
tion is described by power law, P (w) ∼ w−1−α. Repeated empirical studies
Levy Solomon (1997); Dragulescu (2001); Reed Hughes (2002); Aoyama Souma
(2003) show that the power law tail exhibits a remarkable spatial and tem-
poral stability and while the value of the exponent, α, may vary slightly, it
changes little from the value ∼ 1.5.
Even though the collected data stem from different sources and can be in-
complete because of difficulties in accessibility (poor conclusions from income
data in Sweden in Levy Solomon (1997) due to a too small number of wealth
ranges in the data; total net capital of individual at death in the United States
(US) reported to the Bureau of Census and the Inland Revenue for tax her-
itage purposes in Dragulescu (2001); distributions of sizes of incomes, cities,
internet files, biological taxa, gene family and protein family frequencies in
Reed Hughes (2002); and income distributions in the Japan in Aoyama Souma
(2003)) the common conclusion which can be drawn is that the high end that
exhibits the power law is characterised by several multiples or even tens of
multiples of the average income/wealth (only 5% of population income-data
in the US conforms to a power-law and the power law for the yearly income
data in the United Kingdom sets in only for > 50k£ Dragulescu (2001), in-
come distributions in the Japan in 2000 exhibit power laws only for > 5 · 104
thousands of Yen).
For around 100 years the tantalising Pareto law remained without explana-
tion. The renewed interest by physicists and mathematicians in econo- and
sociophysics has however led to publication of a number of new papers on the
topic in recent years (see Slanina (2004) for an extensive literature review).
The fact that multiplicative power law processes can lead to power law distri-
butions has been known for many years from studies as diverse as the frequency
of words in text Yule (1997), economic growth Gibrat (1931), city populations
Zipf (1949), wealth distribution Ijiri (1977) and stochastic renewal processes
Kesten (1973).
In the analysis of these distributions Solomon (2002) has recently proposed the
use of Generalised Lotka Volterra (GLV) equation that combines a multiplica-
tive random process with an autocatalytic process. The latter redistributes
a fraction of the total money to ensure the money possessed by an agent is
never zero. This simulates in a simplistic way the effect of a tax. The model
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equations lead to a wealth distribution P (w) of the form:
P (w) ∼
e(1−α)/w
w1+α
(1)
where and α−1 is a positive number that is a ratio of parameters of the model
that are related to social security and some random investements respectively.
For large values of income w this indeed exhibits a Pareto behaviour.
However two issues arise. The first is that empirical studies of income dis-
tributions show that this function does not describe well the very low end
of the income distribution which is essentially exponentialDragulescu (2001).
The second relates to use of the multiplicative stochastic term. It is certainly
necessary to secure the right form for the distribution function but how does
it arise in the first place?
More recently Chatterjee (2003) have developed a model of pairwise interact-
ing agents i and j that exchange money by analogy with an ensemble of gas
molecules that exchange momentum. In Chatterjee (2003)’s model, however,
the agents are allowed to save a fraction λi of their money prior to an in-
teraction. The total money held between two agents is conserved during the
interaction process. The governing equations for the evolution of wealth wi
and wj of agents i and j respectively are given by:
wi (t+ 1)=λiwi + ǫ [(1− λi)wi + (1− λj)wj]
wj (t+ 1)=λjwj + [1− ǫ] [(1− λi)wi + (1− λj)wj] (2)
Here each agent, i, has a savings propensity, λi. The remaining money is
divided during the exchange process in a random manner determined by a
uniformly distributed random number ǫ between zero and one. From their
numerical calculations Chatterjee (2003) found the following results for the
stationary wealth distribution P (w). Here
(1) With no saving (λi = 0 for all i) agents behave randomly and the dis-
tribution follows the Gibbs rule P (w) ∼ exp(−w/ 〈w〉) where 〈w〉 is the
average wealth of agent. P (w) has a maximum when w = 0.
(2) If the saving propensity is non-zero and takes the same constant value
for all agents (λi = λ for all i) the resulting distribution can be fitted
well by the heuristic function:
P (w) =
nn
Γ(n)
wn−1 exp (−nw) (3)
where Γ(n) is the gamma function and the parameter n is related to the
3
saving propensity, λ as follows:
n (λ) = 1 +
3λ
1− λ
(4)
The power, wn−1, qualitatively changes the distribution so that it has a
maximum for w > 0. The author does not give any theoretical arguments
for the use of this distribution.
(3) If the saving propensity for the agents is chosen according to some ran-
dom distribution, like uniform or power-law distributions with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1,
the numerical output for large values of money gives P (w) ∼ w−1−α.
This is the celebrated Pareto law. Numerical calculations yield a value
for α = 1.03 ± 0.03. The authors show empirical data for wealth distri-
butions for both Japan and the USA. These data clearly exhibit power
laws with values of α greater than this value. However the authors leave
the reader wondering whether the model could fit this data better. A
further calculation allowing only a fraction, p, of agents to save is made
but the the value for the Pareto law remains unchanged. The authors
do not investigate the possible changes in α as a result of using savings
distributions that differ from uniform distributions.
This work is interesting in that it brings together within one framework the
distributions of both Gibbs and Pareto. However it leaves open tantalizing
questions.
(1) Is it possible to predict analytically the expressions 3 and 4?
(2) How does the value of α within the model depend on the nature of the
savings distribution?
(3) Could it be that the value of α is actually unity?
(4) Is there a way of reconciling the approach based on the GLV equations
and the exchange theory of Chakrabarti?
Note that caution has to be taken by fitting the models described above to
income data obtained from Inland Revenues in different countries. As pointed
out in Dragulescu (2000) the wealth has to be understood as a commodity
that is subject to an incessant process of exchange rather then as valueables
like precious metals, “hard currency”, bonds or works of art that have been
deposited in a bank account in order to serve as a lifetime security. In this sense
the distributions that come out of the models should be fitted to a momentary
distribution of money in the society; a distribution they may or may not
be in equillibrium. Since people rarely disclose their momentary wealth the
statistical data one avails of regards more the total wealth of individuals, ie
the wealth that has been accumulated throughout their whole lifetimes and
is reported to the Revenue office only after death (to fulfill the heritage tax
requirements). Since, however, individuals with small and medium wealths are
rather unlikely to invest parts of their income in any sort of lifetime securities,
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because their earnings are small and are spent in their total to cover the cost
of living, the low end of the momentary money distribution in equillibrium
should coincide with the low end of the wealth distribution obtained from the
Revenue data. Differences will only be observed in the high end.
In the next section we develop the theory for the model by Chatterjee (2003)
and show that it is indeed possible to demonstrate that the conjecture sum-
marised above is, to within a certain well defined approximation, correct. We
then study asymptotically the behaviour of the wealth distribution for the
case where the savings propensity varies for the agents and demonstrate that
if the wealth distribution P (w) ∼ w1+α then α is exactly unity for this model.
We demonstrate in section 2.2 that this conclusion remains unchanged even
when three agent exchange processes are allowed. The conclusions of the mean
field analytic analysis are supported by exact numerical simulations shown in
Figs. 5 and 6.
2 Theoretical analysis
Complete information about the processes at time t is given by the N agent dis-
tribution function fN(v1, . . . , vN). In what follows we shall assume the mean-
field approximation. This implies that the N -agent distribution function:
fN(v1, . . . , vN) = P
(⋂
i
vi ≤ Vi ≤ vi + dv
)
/(dv)N =
∏
i
f1(vi) (5)
We can now invoke the Boltzmann equation Ernst (1981) for the one-agent
wealth v distribution f1(v; t) at time t. Thus:
∂tf1(v; t) =
∫
dwdv′dw′ (W (v w|v′ w′) f1(v
′)f1(w
′)−W (v′ w′|v w) f1(v)f1(w)) (6)
where the transition probabilities W () are given via the rules for the collision-
dynamics (2):
W (v′ w′|v w) =
δ (v′ − (λv + ǫ(1 − λ)(v + w))) · δ (w′ − (λw + (1− ǫ)(1− λ)(v + w)))(7)
Introducing the Laplace transform f˜1(x; t) :=
∫
∞
0 f1(v; t) exp(−vx)dv we ob-
tain an integro-differential equation for the temporal evolution:
∂tf˜1(x; t) + f˜1(x; t) =
〈
f˜2 (λx+ ǫ (1− λ)x, ǫ (1− λ)x; t)
〉
(8)
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where the random spatial variability of the saving propensities λ and exchange
fractions ǫ is accounted for by the averaging process 〈〉 over their random
distributions.
We note at this point that this model assumes elastic scattering, i.e. conserva-
tion of wealth during the exchange process (2) and the existence of a stationary
solution. This is in contrast to many previous models formulated in different
contexts where ’wealth’ may be either lost Krapivsky (2002); Ben-Avraham
(2003); Bobylev (2000); Baldassarri (2002) or gained Slanina (2004) in the
exchange process and the distribution function has a power-law-tail only in
an asymptotic sense.
We now write the stationary solutions f˜1(x) = limt−→∞f˜1(x; t) both in terms
of solutions of non-linear integral equations (Master Equations (MEs)) and
in terms of expansions f˜1(x) =
∑
∞
n=0(−1)
nmnx
n over moments (Ms) 〈vn〉 =
mn · n! which satisfy recursion relations. It is convenient to distinguish two
cases:
(I) Saving propensity: λ 6= 0 but equal for all agents:
ME: xf˜1(x) =
1
1− λ
(1−λ)x∫
0
f˜1(λx+ φ)f˜1(φ)dφ (9)
Ms: mp =
p∑
q=0
mqmp−qC˜
(p)
q (λ) with C˜
(p)
q (λ) =
∫ (1−λ)
0 (λ + η)
q ηp−qdη
1− λ
(10)
and C˜
(p)
q+1 =
(1− λ)p−q−1 − (q + 1)C˜(p)q
p− q
with C˜
(p)
0 =
(1− λ)p
p+ 1
(11)
(II) Random saving propensity: λ ∼ ρΛ(λ).
ME: xf˜1(x) =
1∫
0
dλ
ρΛ(λ)
1− λ
(1−λ)x∫
0
f˜1(λx+ φ)f˜1(φ)dφ
Here we waive the writing of equations for the moments since due to to the
wealth distribution having a power-law tail they may not of course exist.
Now an assumption about an asymptotic expansion in the “wealth-domain”:
f1(v) =
∑
∞
n=0 an/v
n+α+1 leads to a decomposition of the function in the
Laplace domain into two parts
f˜1(x) = f˜
reg
1 (x) + f˜
sing
1 (x) (12)
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with the first part being an analytic function f˜
reg
1 (x) = 1 − x + O (x
2) and
the second part f˜
sing
1 (x) =
∑
∞
n=0 bnx
n+α having a leading term xα of order α.
2.1 Conjecture by Patriarca, Chakraborti and Kaski (PCK):
Solving the moments’ equations (10) with initial conditions m0 = 1 and m1 =
1 recursively, ie. expressing, via the pth equation, mp as a function of λ and
all previous values of m, (ie m0, m1, . . . , mp−1), one obtains:
m2=
λ+ 2
2(1 + 2λ)
m3 =
λ+ 2
2(1 + 2λ)2
(13)
m4=
72 + 12λ− 2λ2 + 9λ3 − λ5
24(1 + 2λ)2(3 + 6λ− λ2 + 2λ3)
(14)
The first three moments m1, m2 and m3 coincide with the moments of PCKs
function (3) if the relation between the parameters n and λ is given by (4).
Indeed the coefficients of a series expansion of the Laplace transform
P˜ (x) =
∞∫
0
P (ξ) exp(−ξx)dξ =
(
n
x+ n
)n
(15)
of the function (3) agree with moments (14) up to the third order subject
to equation (4) being satisfied. This is shown in a nice way in Fig. 1. The
deviation ∆f˜1(x) between the exact solution of the ME (9) and the ansatz (3)
has a leading fourth order:
∆f˜1(x) =
(n− 1)(n+ 1)(n+ 8)
8n3(10n3 + 30n2 + 45n− 4)
x4 +O
(
x5
)
(16)
It is hard to say if a more general class of functions than (3) would satisfy the
ME to higher expansion orders.
2.2 The power-law tail:
Calculations by Chatterjee (2003) and ourselves suggest that the value of the
exponent α is equal to one. Let us look at this aspect in more detail. Inserting
the expansion (12) into the ME (9) and comparing coefficients of order xα+1 on
both sides of the equation leads to a transcendental equation for the exponent,
7
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0.4 0.6 0.8 1 λ
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
∆(λ;n)
Anal. n = 5
Anal. n = 4
Anal. n = 3
Anal. n = 2
Num. n = 5
Num. n = 4
Num. n = 3
Num. n = 2
Fig. 1. Deviations ∆(λ;n) =
∑10
p=0
∣∣∣(mp(λ)−mconjp (n))/p!∣∣∣ of the exact moments
mp of the wealth distribution from the moments m
conj
p derived from the conjecture
plotted as a function of λ for n = 2, 3 . . . , 9. Solid lines (dot symbols) correspond to
analytical (numerical) solutions of the moment equations (10). We see that the min-
ima λ = (n−1)/(n+2) = {1/4, 2/5, 3/6, 4/7, 5/8, 6/9, 7/10, 8/11} of the deviations
do correspond to the PCK conjecture (4).
α:
〈(1− λ)α〉+
〈
1− λα+1
1− λ
〉
= α + 1 (17)
Clearly if we choose α = 1, (17) we obtain an indentity for any distribution
of λ. This would seem to be true even for a distribution that assumes only
a fraction p of the agents save and the remainder do not save, i.e. ρ
(1)
Λ (λ) =
pρΛ(λ) + (1− p)δ(λ).
However, whether other solutions for α exist is an open question and depends
on the distribution of the saving propensity ρΛ(λ). We try to clarify this ques-
tion below.
For uniformly distributed propensities ρΛ(λ) = 1/l2 for 0 ≤ λ ≤ l2 ≤ 1 the
only solution is α = 1 (see Fig. 2). Likewise if ρΛ(λ) is a normal distribution
with a variable mean l2 where |l2| ≤ 1 and the standard deviation is small
(See Fig.3) or with a fixed mean and variable standard deviation (Fig.4) the
exponent similarly turns out to be unity.
Now we make a stronger statement and say that there is no continuous and
differentiable distribution of saving propensities λ ∈ [0, 1] that would yield
α 6= 1. Indeed since every distribution ρΛ(λ) can be constructed as a weighted
8
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
1.95
2.05
2.1
2.15
rhs
l2 = 1.0
l2 = 0.9
l2 = 0.8
l2 = 0.6
l2 = 0.4
l2 = 0.2
l2 = 0.1
Fig. 2. The left-hand-side of equation (17) plotted as a function of α for a uniformly
random saving propensity λ with 0 < λ < l2 for different values of l2 (dashed lines)
and the right-hand-side (rhs) of the equation (17) (solid line). As we can see there
is no other solution of the transcendental equation (17) except α = 1 in the range
α ∈ [0, 2].
(possibly continuous) linear combination of uniform distributions
ρΛ(λ) =
1∫
0
w(ν)U(0, ν)dν (18)
and since for a uniform distribution U(0, ν) the left-hand side of the transcen-
dental equation (17) intersects the right-hand side only for α = 1 in the range
α ∈ [0, 2] then the last statement holds also for a generic distribution ρΛ(λ).
Here we used conditional averaging. This means that the average in equation
(17) is carried out as an average over U(0, ν) conditioned on ν first and then
over the distribution w(ν) of random values of ν.
2.3 Beyond the mean-field approximation:
Many-agent distribution functions fN (x1, . . . , xN ) may not be produced cor-
rectly within the mean-field approach. Furthermore the wealth-exchange model
by Chatterjee (2003) may be extended to N-point interactions:
wi (t+ 1) = λiwi + ǫi

 N∑
j=1
(1− λj)wj

 ∑
i
ǫi = 1 (19)
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0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
1.8
2.2
2.4
2.6
rhs
l2 = 0.9
l2 = 0.7
l2 = 0.6
l2 = 0.45
l2 = 0.3
l2 = 0.1
Fig. 3. The same as in Fig.2 but for the propensity λ conforming to a truncated
|λ| ≤ 1 normal distribution with variable mean l2 and standard deviation 0.01.
As before dashed lines denote the left-hand side and the solid line denotes the
right-hand side of equation (17). Again the only solution of the transcendental
equation is α = 1 in the range α ∈ [0, 2].
0.25 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 1.5 1.75 2
1.9
1.95
2.05
2.1
2.15
rhs
std = 4.0
std = 1.0
std = 0.5
std = 0.1
std = 0.05
std = 0.01
Fig. 4. The same as in Figs.2 and 3 except that now the mean of the normal
distribution of propensities λ is fixed and equal to 0.5 and the standard deviation
varies. Here again no new solutions except α = 1 are obtained.
Here we mean that at every time step exchange processes involving any number
of agents can happen – each with a certain likelihood. We perform the analysis
for N = 3 in order to find out what kind of mathematical difficulties we will
come across. Now the master equation for the 2-agent distribution function in
the Laplace domain (compare with (8)) reads:
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∂tf˜2(x, y; t) + f˜2(x, y; t) =
(1− σ)
〈
f˜2 (λx+ λ1 (ǫx+ (1− ǫ)y) , λy + λ1 (ǫx+ (1− ǫ)y) ; t)
〉
+
σ
2
〈
f˜3 (λx+ λ1 (ǫ1x+ ǫ2y) , λy + λ1 (ǫ1x+ ǫ2y) , λ1 (ǫ1x+ ǫ2y) ; t)
〉
+
σ
2
〈
f˜3 (λ1 (ǫ2x+ ǫ3y) , λx+ λ1 (ǫ2x+ ǫ3y) , λy + λ1 (ǫ2x+ ǫ3y) ; t)
〉
(20)
where λ + λ1 = 1, ǫ + ǫ1 ≤ 1 and σ and (1 − σ) denote likelihoods of three-
agent and two-agent exchange processes respectively. The first (second and
third) term(s) on the right-hand side in (20) account(s) for two-(three-)agent
exchange processes repectively. Setting y = 0 we obtain equation (8) except
for three-agent exchange terms that were neglected in the first place and now
have been added appropriately. Setting x = y = 0 we obtain an identity from
the normalisation condition f2(0, 0) = f3(0, 0, 0) = 1.
2.4 The power-law tail with three-agent exchange processes:
Now the transcendental equation, derived from the master equation (20), has
the following form:
(1− σ)
[
〈(1− λ)α〉+
〈
1− λα+1
1− λ
〉]
+
σ
2
α + 2
[
2 〈(1− λ)α〉+
〈
1− (α + 2)λα+1 + (α + 1)λα+2
(1− λ)2
〉]
= α + 1 (21)
and a α = 1 is again the only solution (compare Fig.5) of this equation for ar-
bitrary saving propensity distributions ρΛ(λ) and for any likelihood σ ∈ [0, 1]
of three-agent exchange processes. This is in conformance with our numeri-
cal simulations that also show that an introduction of three-agent exchange
processes do not alter the exponent.
2.5 Moment equations in the case of two- and three-agent exchange processes:
The expansion of the steady-state solution in terms of two-agent correlations
〈vpwq〉 = mp,q · (p!q!) now reads f2(x, y) =
∑
∞
p,q=0(−1)
p+qmp,qx
pyq and the
two-agent correlations satisfy following equations:
11
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
rhsl2 = 1.0
l2 = 0.9l2 = 0.8
l2 = 0.7l2 = 0.6
l2 = 0.5l2 = 0.4
l2 = 0.3l2 = 0.2
l2 = 0.1
Fig. 5. The second term (corresponding to three agent exchange processes) on the
left-hand-side of equation (21) plotted as a function of α for a uniformly random
saving propensity λ with 0 < λ < l2 for different values of l2 (dashed lines) and
the right-hand-side (rhs) of the equation (17) (solid line). We see that three-agent
exchange processes do not lead to a change of the exponent α from unity to a
different value.
mp,q = (1− σ)
∑
p1 + q1 = p
p2 + q2 = q

 p1 + p2
p1



 q1 + q2
q1

mp1+p2,q1+q2C˜(p,q)p1,q2(λ)+
σ
∑
p1 + q1 + r1 = p
p2 + q2 + r2 = q

 p1 + p2
p1



 q1 + q2
q1



 r1 + r2
r1

mp1+p2,q1+q2,r1+r2D˜(p,q)p1,q2(λ)(22
where
C˜(p,q)p1,q1(λ)=
1
λ
λ1∫
0
dξ (λ+ ξ)p1 ξp−p1 (1− ξ)q1 (λ1 − ξ)
q−q1
D˜(p,q)p1,q1(λ)=
2
λ21
λ1∫
0
dξ
λ1−ξ∫
0
dη (λ+ ξ)p1 ξp−p1 (λ+ η)q1 ηq−q1 (23)
If we neglect ternary exchange processes (σ = 0) we end up with following
equations for the moments of the 1-agent distribution function:
m2 = m1,1
λ+ 2
2(1 + 2λ)
m3 =
m1,2
1 + 2λ
12
m4 = m1,3
(4− 2λ+ 2λ2 + λ3)
2(3 + 6λ− λ2 + 2λ3)
−m2,2
−6 + 3λ+ 2λ2 + λ3
6(3 + 6λ− λ2 + 2λ3)
m5 =
((2− 2λ+ 3λ2)m1,4 − 2(−1 + λ)m2,3)
(4 + 8λ− 3λ2 + 6λ3)
(24)
These equation reduce to equations (14) under the mean-field approximation
mp,q = mpmq.
3 Exact computer simulations of the model
Intuitively, it is clear that the distribution function depends critically on the
relative values of the mean value of the savings propensity and the spread or
mean square deviation of the saving distribution function. As the spread of
saving propensities tends to zero, the distribution function must change from
one having a power law tail to one with an exponential tail. How does this
change take place? Could it be that the effective power law region shifts to
take on values of α > 1? Might this explain the empirically observed facts?
We have made computer simulations of the model for different values of these
parameters. The results are described below.
A uniform distribution of the savings parameter λ in the model of Chatterjee
(2003) results in a power law distribution of the cumulative distribution shown
in the Fig. 6.
The situation is different in the case of λ being Gaussian distributed. Here
the cumulative wealth distribution may still be approximately described by a
power law for widths between 1 and 0.45 (see Fig. 7).
One thing seems clear. The region where power law behaviour is observed is
fairly well marked even when the spread is small. And moreover the slope is
consistent with higher values of α. However it does not seem that α can take
on values greater than around 1.2. As it stands then we conclude that this
model does not offer a complete picture of the empirically observed wealth
dynamics.
4 Conclusions
We have studied the model of interacting agents proposed by Chatterjee (2003)
that allows agents to both save and exchange wealth. Closed equations for the
wealth distribution are developed using a mean field approximation.
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Fig. 6. Results of computer simulations, obtained for 500 agents, and 39000 reali-
sations, each taken after 100000 equilibration steps. The data is well described by
a power law with exponent -1 in the range of 0.3 up to about 15 times the average
money per agent. Changing the width of the distribution of λ immediately leads
to a loss of the power law. The latter may be a finite size effect since our analyt-
ical calculations from section 2.2 show that the power-law does occur for uniform
distributions of any widths.
We have shown that when all agents have the same fixed savings propensity,
subject to certain well defined approximations defined in the text, these equa-
tions yield the conjecture proposed by Chatterjee (2003) for the form of the
stationary agent wealth distribution.
If the savings propensity for the equations is chosen according to some random
distribution we have further shown that the wealth distribution for large val-
ues of wealth displays a Pareto like power law tail, ie P (w) ∼ w1+a. However
the value of a for the model is exactly 1. Exact numerical simulations for the
model illustrate how, as the savings distribution function narrows to zero, the
wealth distribution changes from a Pareto form to to an exponential function.
Intermediate regions of wealth may be approximately described by a power
law with a > 1. However the value never reaches values of∼ 1.6−1.7 that char-
acterise empirical wealth data. This conclusion is not changed if three body
agent exchange processes are allowed. We conclude that other mechanisms are
14
 0.0001
 0.001
 0.01
 0.1
 1
 0.01  0.1  1  10  100
cu
m
u
la
tiv
e 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
of
 m
on
ey
 P
(m
)
money m
Gaussian distribution of saving parameter
with mean 0.5 and width 0.8
0.45
0.3
0.2
0.1
Fig. 7. The same as in Fig. 6 but for the saving propensity being Gaussian dis-
tributed. Here the power law exponent decreases with decreasing width, but only
over a small range from -1 to -1.13. Narrower Gaussian distributions do not re-
sult in wealth distributions that can be described by power law. (Note that in the
limit of small widths both Gaussian and uniform distribution give the same wealth
distribution.)
required if the model is to agree with empirical wealth data.
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